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 1
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI 
 Amici are authors and scholars who write, teach, and research with scholarly 
works like the ones at issue in this case. Academic Author amici’s interest in this 
case stems from a strong desire to see their works reach the largest possible 
audience and have the greatest possible impact and use, especially by users at 
educational institutions like Georgia State University (“GSU”) in order to promote 
scholarly exchange and further research. A ruling that restricts reuse of scholarly 
works would frustrate these objectives. Many Academic Author amici have 
authored works published by Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press 
and Sage Publications (“Publishers”). At least one signer, Professor Lyle F. 
Bachman, is the original creator of two works on which Publishers have based 
their infringement claims in this case.  
Legal Scholars amici share the same values and concerns, and have an 
additional interest in the sound development of intellectual property law. 
Educational uses of copyrighted works are at the core of what the fair use doctrine 
is designed to protect. The resolution of this case will have a profound impact on 
the continued ability of fair use to foster these and other uses that support the 
Constitutional mission of copyright, “to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.” U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Appendix A contains the full list of amici.  
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly conclude that GSU’s use of Publishers’ 
copyrighted works is a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107? 
2. Did the district court incorrectly conclude that the use of existing 
scholarship for the new purpose of educating students was not a transformative 
use?  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 For centuries, scholars and educators have excerpted the works of their 
colleagues, transforming them from individual, static monographs into dynamic 
pedagogical and intellectual tools for classroom learning. Such transformations 
reside at the heart of fair use, a core copyright law doctrine established to protect 
socially beneficial uses of works that increase public access and promote the 
progress of human understanding. 
In this case, Plaintiff Publishers accuse GSU and its faculty of violating their 
copyrights through this practice. But, as the district court correctly found, such 
uses are fair, especially because they primarily use factual information to promote 
the purposes of education and teaching, the amount taken was reasonable in light 
of its purpose, and because Plaintiffs’ evidence of a cognizable copyright market 
harm was speculative at best. However, the district court erred when it incorrectly 
concluded that these uses are not transformative. Using an unduly narrow 
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definition of the concept, it failed to consider how educators repurpose scholarly 
works in productive ways that bring new meaning to and understanding of the 
works used. 
As scholars and educators who produce and repurpose such works, amici 
urge this Court to affirm that these uses constitute a transformative use under the 
first fair use factor, and to reaffirm the findings under the other factors that these 
uses are fair. A finding of fair use in this case not only furthers the underlying 
goals of scholarship and education—access to knowledge—but also the very 
purposes of the Copyright Act itself. 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. Educational Uses of Excerpts from Copyrighted Material on Course-related 
E-reserves Sites Are Examples of Productive, Transformative Fair Use 
 
Educational uses of copyrighted material are routinely productive and 
transformative in precisely the way contemplated by the fair use doctrine because 
they put the works to new and different purposes than those for which they were 
originally created. Consider a college instructor teaching “Trends in Central 
European Political History” who uses scholarly articles and book chapters written 
over the past 70 years to illustrate and provoke class discussion of shifting 
historiographical trends in writing about the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
These were writings produced and intended to be read in an academic setting. But 
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whereas they were originally designed to provide authoritative specialist accounts 
of various features of the Dual Monarchy in decline, they are being employed here 
for another, independently valuable educational purpose: to display the ways in 
which thinking and writing about the subject have changed over time.1 Set in 
context, each excerpt informs and contextualizes the others, giving students a 
perspective that they could not gain from the individual works. This standard 
instructional practice, in which excerpts of existing scholarship are turned to the 
new purpose of teaching the next generation of students to read, think and write 
critically, represents a significant, new “transformative” use of copyrighted 
material. 
 “[Copyright law] reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public 
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation 
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1975). Providing access to excerpts of specially chosen selections so that an 
instructor can knit together an overall educational message develops students’ 
                                                                
1 See, e.g., Poetry Foundation, Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Poetry 
(2010), www.poetryfoundation.org/foundation/bestpractices (addressing the 
transformative use of copyrighted poetry in teaching (Principle Four)); Assoc. Res. 
Libr., Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries 
(2012), http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/publications/code-of-best-practices-
fair-use.pdf (addressing issues such as the on-line availability of selections of 
copyrighted material in support of college and university courses (Principle One)). 
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capacity to understand, interpret, and subsequently contribute to the world of 
ideas—the purpose of copyright, and of fair use.2 The educational purpose of a use, 
particularly when undertaken in a non-profit institution of higher education, 
therefore deserves special consideration in any fair use analysis. 
Certain productive, “transformative” uses were specifically enumerated by 
Congress in the preamble to § 107: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(with specific reference to multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research. These enumerated uses, according to the legislative history, were “the 
sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair 
uses.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) (citations 
omitted). “There is a strong presumption that the use of a copyrighted work is 
transformative when the allegedly infringing work falls within one of several 
categories described in Section 107.” Hofheinz v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 
60 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1845, 1848 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing New Era Publications Int'l ApS 
                                                                
2 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 
1816 (2000) (noting the connection and potential temporal gap between access and 
new creative works); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565 
(2004) (“Copying promotes democracy by literally putting information in citizens’ 
hands…. Access . . . was a precondition of any further response to or use of those 
works. When Paul Goldstein writes that uses in schools and libraries ‘advance 
copyright’s general aim of promoting cultural and political discourse,’ he is also 
invoking the value of access, which can sometimes only be had if the copyright 
owner’s price need not be paid.” (citations omitted)); Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, 
and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 726 (2003). 
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v. Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1990) (if the new use constitutes 
criticism, scholarship or research, “the assessment of the first fair use factor should 
be at an end”)). In other words, the Copyright Act means what it says when it 
specifically identifies “teaching,” including “multiple copies for classroom use,” 
as an illustrative example of fair use.  
A. Considerations of Transformative “Purpose” Favor 
the Educational Uses at Stake in this Case 
 
The presence of a new, expressive purpose qualifies a use as transformative 
and thus likely fair and non-infringing.3 Few activities are closer to the heart of the 
protected zone of expression than the efforts of a graduate-level instructor to 
engage students in critical reading and discussion of both primary source materials 
and prior scholarly communications. The goal of such efforts, as Ann Bartow has 
explained, is “to expose students to a variety of viewpoints, which are arguably 
                                                                
3 Anthony Reese has identified trends in fair use case law emphasizing that 
transformative purpose outweighs change in the material form—identical copying 
has been protected as fair use in several significant cases covering large sectors of 
the economy where it serves the purpose of increasing access. See R. Anthony 
Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
467, 484-85 (2008) (“In assessing transformativeness, the courts generally 
emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s purpose in using the 
underlying work, rather than any transformation (or lack thereof) by the defendant 
of the content of the underlying work.”). See also Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling 
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L.REV. 2537 (2009); Michael J. Madison, Madisonian 
Fair Use, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.101 (2012). 
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most pedagogically useful when unadulterated.”4 Instructors’ transformative 
purposes are fulfilled through both the contrasts between selected excerpts and 
their incorporation into a broader context: a change in meaning occurs when the 
works are placed in dialogue with one another, just as there can be transformation 
when multiple works are used in search engines5 or collages.6 
Transformativeness in this form allows learning and critique that cannot 
otherwise occur. It prevents instructors’ decisions about what excerpts to use from 
being distorted by owners’ refusals to grant permission or by payment demands; 
without fair use as a safety valve, the resulting educational materials may be 
biased. This would interfere with the congressionally favored educational purpose.7  
This is not a theoretical concern. Fair use is critical to educational 
institutions, whose societal role is centered on learning and critique, and whose 
                                                                
4 Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to 
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 178 (1998) (noting that instructors 
compiling excerpts for course support “inevitably make editorial” choices in the 
process). 
5 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
6 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
7 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 565-66 (“Copyright’s prohibition on copying can 
create differential access in precisely the way some First Amendment theorists fear 
government regulation can subtly distort debate. For example, Who Built America? 
is an award-winning historical CD-ROM series for high school and college 
students that uses numerous primary sources. Owners of the sources’ copyrights 
often wanted large payments for use of historically significant works, payments the 
authors couldn’t afford. They substituted federal government and public domain 
works, altering the way students will understand the past; the materials now 
overemphasize the federal government’s role in Depression-era society and 
culture.”) (citation omitted). 
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limited resources do not allow them to license every excerpt. But the fair use right 
involved here is one that belongs to all instructors, and benefits all students, 
regardless of their economic situation. Deborah Gerhardt and Madelyn Wessel 
document vast disparities in access to content, even among relatively well-
resourced institutions; the situation is much more dire for smaller institutions, 
community colleges, and the like.8  
Giving special weight to educational uses recognizes that such uses have 
positive externalities, conferring benefits on society for which neither nonprofit 
educational institutions nor their students can practically internalize—a classic 
market failure of the kind that fair use was designed to avoid.9 The uses 
enumerated in the preamble to Section 107 “provide external societal benefits far 
beyond the benefits to the individual who . . .  is making the criticism, the 
comment, the news report or the individual who is doing the teaching, the 
                                                                
8 Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 
11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 461, 482 (2010) (“A legal position that payment is always 
required in contravention of this explicit authorization [of ‘multiple copies for 
classroom use’] exacerbates these fundamental disparities in access to information 
and removes an important remedial mechanism available by law.”). 
9 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1640 
(1982) (teaching uses create positive externalities because “all of society benefits 
[by] having an educated citizenry and advances in knowledge”). 
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scholarship or the research. But these societal benefits are impossible to internalize 
in any bargained-for exchange between the copyright owner and the user.”10 
1. The First Fair Use Factor Recognizes and Promotes Expressive 
Uses of Copyrighted Content 
 
The first fair use factor (“the purpose and character of the use…” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107(1) (2006)) is capacious enough to recognize these needs. Transformativeness 
is a dynamic concept that has been applied to diverse uses, as a way of recognizing 
the speech and speech-related functions that copyright exists to promote and 
defend.11 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 
2007), the Ninth Circuit concluded that use of copyrighted images in a thumbnail 
search index was “highly transformative,” even though there was no argument that 
the search tool itself was a new work. In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms 
                                                                
10 Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in 
an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 50 (1997). 
(“The fact that a copyright owner has been able to convince others to pay the fee 
demanded and therefore now can claim to have a ‘workable’ permission system 
should not change the analysis. The Court’s refusal to recognize a mere desire to 
be paid as evidence of market harm when a defendant does not meet that desire 
with cash emphasizes the fundamental role that fair use plays in the scheme of 
copyright law—permitting certain kinds of uses that can have significant, diffuse, 
external benefits in society regardless of whether the copyright owner would 
permit such a use or would like to be paid for such a use.” (citations omitted)).  
11 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) and Golan v. Holder, 132 
S.Ct. 873, 890-91 (2012). Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group 
of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“[T]he presentation of an edited compilation 
of speech generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers’ opinion 
pages, which, of course, fall squarely within the core of First Amendment security . 
. . .” (citation omitted)). 
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LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009), a case involving the use of student papers to 
create a database facilitating the detection of plagiarism, the Fourth Circuit 
approvingly noted the trial judge’s determination that the database was “‘highly 
transformative,’… and ‘provides a substantial public benefit through the network 
of [participating] educational institutions.’” Id. at 638.12 Recently, the General 
Counsel of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office concluded that copying journal 
articles for the purpose of allowing applicants and patent examiners to understand 
“prior art” was a transformative fair use, notwithstanding the existence of an 
established licensing market for such reproductions. USPTO, Position on Fair Use 
of Copies of NPL Made in Patent Examination (January 19, 2012), 
www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/USPTOPositiononFairUse_of_CopiesofNPLMa
deinPatentExamination.pdf. 
The case law thus clearly rejects any suggestion that transformativeness 
requires physical modification or the creation of a new, copyrightable work. 
Transformative use also can occur when a work is meaningfully 
reconcontextualized to serve the user’s new purpose.13 That is, uses can be favored 
under the first factor because of the way in which they are given context by the 
                                                                
12 See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1351, 1353-57 
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (upholding copying of entire articles by library for research purposes 
as fair use even if the material is not “crucial” as long as it is “stimulating or 
helpful”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
13 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006).  
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user, and that context need not be a physical collage. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-20 (9th Cir. 2003); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 
235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
2. The District Court’s Refusal to Consider the Eligibility 
of the Challenged Educational Practices as Transformative 
Uses Was Based on Several Misplaced Concerns 
 
The district court declined to characterize GSU’s uses as transformative 
because they did not meet one form of the concept—to reach a different audience. 
However, Campbell has defined the term “transformative” to include different 
purposes, Campbell 510 U.S. at 579, and so the fact that the district court failed to 
so find should not preclude this Court from deciding that the uses were 
transformative whenever assigned for a different purpose from the original 
intended audience for the work. The district court strayed from this principle by 
focusing on two misplaced concerns:  
First, the district court focused on the apparently straightforward proposition 
that the “purpose” of material from a monograph does not change when it is 
excerpted for students’ on-line use: material that was designed for reading is being 
presented anew with the expectation that it will be read. This argument misses the 
mark by focusing on the “mechanical” aspects of information consumption rather 
than on the expressive purposes of the use. On this logic, repurposing a photograph 
as an emblem of consumer culture in an iconoclastic painting could not be a 
 12
transformative use because both photographer and painter intended their work to 
be viewed.14 Nor could a parody of a bestseller be seen as a transformative use if 
the parodist also aspired to sell books to the general reading public.15 More 
appropriately, a decision-maker in a case about e-reserves should compare the 
“discursive” purpose of the original text, on the one hand, with the goals of the 
instructor who has posted it for his or her class to read, discuss, criticize, and 
incorporate into a broader context. It is this new purpose that controls, not the 
overlap in audiences. 
Second, the district court was concerned with dictum in footnote 11 of 
Campbell, which states that “[t]he obvious statutory exception to th[e general] 
focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for 
classroom distribution.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The point is an important one: 
not all fair uses necessarily need be transformative. An elementary school teacher 
who hands out photocopies—for example, a poem about spring at springtime, or a 
news article following up on an issue discussed in class—may not have a 
transformative purpose, even though the use is one specifically approved in 
Section 107. But the Court’s language cannot fairly be read to mean that all efforts 
by instructors at all levels are categorically “non-transformative.” The Supreme 
Court’s language roughly paraphrases the preamble to Section 107 but introduces a 
                                                                
14 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir. 2006). 
15 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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significant new qualifier, “straight,”16 whose only apposite dictionary definition is 
“undiluted, unmixed [as in] straight whiskey.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1208 (2001) (sense 15). “Straight reproduction” cannot, 
however, describe the use of excerpts from monographs in e-reserves for graduate 
courses. No competent instructor would ever offer such material without providing 
an explanation for its appearance in relation to the goals of the course, whether on 
the e-reserves site, in other course materials (such as a syllabus), or in classroom 
discussion.  
II. Scholarly Works Are Factual and Informative in Nature; the Second 
Factor Weighs in Favor of the Use 
 
Campbell tells us that the fair use factors are interrelated and must be 
weighted together. Campbell 510 U.S. at 578. When the first factor is 
transformative, this has spillover effects for the other factors; given the 
transformative educational purpose here, the question is whether each of the other 
factors is reasonable in light of that.  
The second fair use factor requires an examination of “the nature of the 
copyrighted work.” 17 U.SC. § 107, recognizing that “there is a hierarchy of 
copyright protection in which original, creative works are afforded greater 
protection than derivative works or factual compilations.” Suntrust Bank v. 
                                                                
16 This is on the assumption that e-reserves are functionally equivalent to the 
distribution of paper copies. 
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Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001). This is so because 
copyright protects creative expressions, not ideas or facts, no matter how creative 
or how much effort was expended to compile them. Palmer v. Braun, 287 F. 3d 
1325 (11th Cir. 2002).  
We agree with the district court that the scholarly works used in this case are 
“informational in nature, within the spectrum of factual materials and hence 
favoring fair use.” Dkt#423 at 52. While the district court recognized that scholarly 
works require a tremendous amount of effort and expense to create, id., and that it 
“inevitably involves some amount of creativity,” id., the court understood that such 
effort and creativity is focused on non-copyrightable elements: ideas and facts. The 
district court rightly weighed the second factor in favor of the use.  
In addition, this Court should recognize that the second factor is sensitive to 
the purposes for which scholars write and for which instructors provide students 
with excerpts. Robert Kasunic and Judge Pierre Leval have reminded us that a 
complete second factor analysis includes many elements, including an inquiry into 
“whether copyright might have reasonably encouraged or provided an incentive for 
an author to create the work.” Robert Kasunic, Is That All There Is? Reflections on 
the Second Fair Use Factor, 31 COLUMBIA J. L. & ARTS 529, 540 (2008); see also 
Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118-19 
(1990). As discussed above, publication and broad access generally are key goals 
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for academic authors, who “want recognition for their theories and analysis, and 
also want their works to be as widely read as possible.” Kasunic, supra, at 540. 
Given these goals, the nature of the works counsels in favor of freely allowing 
exactly the sort of discursive repurposing in which the instructors involved in this 
case engaged. 
III. The Amount and Substantiality Used by GSU Faculty Was Reasonable 
 
The third fair use factor looks at “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” The third factor 
inquiry “partly functions as a heuristic to determine the impact on the market for 
the original.” Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology 
Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). In terms of transformative 
uses, the test is whether “the quantity and value of the material used . . . are 
reasonable in relation to the purpose of the use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. The 
standard is reasonableness, not (as sometimes is suggested) necessity, and any 
instructor who relies on fair use to justify the inclusion of excerpts from published 
works on e-reserves should be prepared to explain the rationale for both the choice 
of material and the amount employed. No numerical metric or “rule of thumb,” 
whether stated in absolute or proportional terms, can substitute effectively for this 
assessment.  
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Publishers criticize the district court’s work-by-work analysis as “rigid,” 
Appellants’ Br. at 46, yet at the same time suggest that the court should have 
instead followed a set of prescriptive, 1970s-era Classroom Guidelines created for 
photocopying uses.17 Id. at 63. The district court was correct that application of the 
Classroom Guidelines as a presumptive maximum would cripple the ability of 
GSU and institutions like it to make many undisputedly legitimate fair uses of 
scholarly works. Dkt#423 at 70-71. Furthermore, such an inflexible rule would cut 
against the very heart of what the district court correctly described as the “fact-
intensive, value-laden review” that fair use requires. Id. at 19. Publishers reject that 
level of analysis because, as explained below, it requires evidence of likely harm 
that they cannot produce. 
IV. Educational Use of the Works at Issue Benefits the Public and Publishers 
Have Not Shown Evidence of Actual Harm to a Relevant Market 
 
 The fourth fair use factor asks the court to examine “the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
Two key factors central to this case and at the heart of amici’s role in the university 
                                                                
17 Although we reject the notion that the 1976 Classroom Guidelines are relevant 
at all to the present case, to the extent that the Court does consider them it should 
recognize their intended purpose. Publishers assert that the Classroom Guidelines 
“place strict limits on nonprofit educational copying.” Appellants’ Br. at 63. That 
is incorrect. The Guidelines drafters warned, in the very first sentence of the 
document, that “[t]he purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum 
and not the maximum standards of educational fair use under 107.” H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476 at 68-71, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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context are important to analyzing market effect: (1) public interest and 
(2) academic freedom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (fair use 
serves as a First Amendment accommodation that provides for “considerable 
latitude for scholarship and comment”) (citation omitted)); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“[A]cademic freedom 
. . . is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. 
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment.”); Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. U. S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (courts must sometimes 
“subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial return to the 
greater public interest” to fulfill copyright’s Constitutional purpose), aff'd by an 
equally divided Court., 420 U.S. 376 (1975).  
With these in mind, the fourth factor requires an examination of “(1) ‘the 
extent of the market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer,’ 
and (2) ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the 
defendant [ ] would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market.’ ” Peter Letterese & Assoc. Inc., 533 F. 3d at 1315 (citing Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 590). 
A. Publishers Have Failed to Prove That Faculty Uses of Excerpts 
in this Case Will Harm Any Relevant Markets 
 
In this inquiry, the Court should carefully scrutinize whether Publishers 
(1) have identified a relevant and proper market and (2) shown their claims of 
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harm to that market, specifically. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley 
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006) (transformative markets are improper 
markets to consider under the fourth factor); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S.., 
487 F. 2d at 1357 (rejecting studies that have “assumed, without real proof, that 
the journal publishers have been and will be injured” by educational 
photocopying). A high burden of proof on both elements is appropriate given the 
educational, nonprofit context of the use. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. 
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir.1996) (“The burden of proof as to market 
effect rests with the copyright holder if the challenged use is of a ‘noncommercial’ 
nature.”); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 451 (1984) (“What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.”); Suntrust Bank, 
268 F.3d at 1275 (“[E]vidence of harm to the potential market for or value of the 
original copyright is crucial to a fair use determination.”).18 They have failed to 
do either. 
                                                                
18 Citing to Campbell, the district court incorrectly distinguished this rule and held 
instead that the burden rests on the Defendant to prove that “any harm from the 
infringing use is insubstantial.” Dkt#423 at 72 & n.43 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 590). While the Supreme Court did reject “hard evidentiary presumptions” about 
harm, it did so in the context of commercial uses, explaining that the district court 
in that case incorrectly made “a presumption about the effect of commercial use, a 
presumption which as applied here we hold to be error.” Campbell, 510 U.S at 591. 
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First, as the section above explains, many of the educational uses of the kind 
made by GSU faculty are transformative. Because transformative uses do not 
substitute for or supersede the original, courts in other circuits have made clear that 
“copyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets” 
through proposed licensing regimes. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615; 
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998)( 
“[B]y developing or licensing a market for . . .  educational or other transformative 
uses of its own creative work, a copyright owner plainly cannot prevent others 
from entering those fair use markets.”); iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 644 (harm caused 
by transformative use “is not of the kind protected against by copyright law”). 
These fair use markets are therefore not proper for consideration of market harm 
under the fourth factor. 
Second, even for uses that are not transformative in the classic sense, the fair 
use doctrine especially supports educational uses including “teaching . . . , 
scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C § 107. Congress identified these activities for 
protection because of their clear public benefit and a recognition that they are very 
likely to be fair. Without careful scrutiny of the Publishers’ assertions of harm, the 
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Court runs the risk of restricting socially valuable uses that fulfill one of the key 
constitutional purposes of copyright, namely increasing access to knowledge.19  
Publishers argue, for example, that their market for book sales is harmed by 
the use of short excerpts by GSU faculty. The district court rejected this simplistic 
assumption on logical grounds. “[T]he excerpts were generally a small part 
(averaging around 10%) of the whole copyrighted work. Such a small excerpt does 
not substitute for the book as a whole. . . . The 10% excerpt would not substitute 
for the original, no matter how many copies were made. In short, Defendants’ use 
of small excerpts did not affect Plaintiffs’ actual or potential sales of books.” 
Dkt#423 at 74. But beyond Publishers’ poor logic is also their lack of proof. The 
record contains no evidence to suggest that faculty excerpts made for the purposes 
of teaching, and for enhancing and encouraging student research and scholarship, 
have ever harmed the market for sales of complete books. Moreover, if anyone had 
such evidence, it would be the Publishers who have all the relevant sales data. If 
book sales dropped due to faculty excerpting, Publishers could easily demonstrate 
                                                                
19 Due in part to such concerns, even in the context of a finding of intellectual 
property infringement, several courts have held that plaintiffs much show evidence 
of actual harm for injunctive relief purposes; presumptions are not enough. See 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“courts must not presume 
irreparable harm”); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 
2011); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (in 
the patent context, “plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury” and (among other things) “that the public interest would not be 
disserved” for an injunction to issue). 
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this with a timeline of book sales mapped to courses taught using excerpts from 
those books. But no such evidence is anywhere to be found, reinforcing the 
longstanding experience that academic excerpts do not cause harm to a relevant 
copyright market under the fourth factor. 
Lacking actual evidence, Publishers urge the Court instead to adopt the 
reasoning and conclusions about market harm found in a few “coursepack” cases, 
with little regard for the differences between the pure educational uses here and the 
reproductions by commercial intermediaries there. See, e.g., Appellants’ Br. at 69 
(citing Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s 
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y 1991)).  
 Publishers’ market harm argument based on the availability of licensed 
excerpts is similarly superficial. Again, presenting no actual evidence, Publishers 
instead ask the Court to assume harm simply because they have made licenses 
available for some of the excerpts at issue. Appellants’ Br. at 79. But the mere 
availability of a license is not proof of harm, nor should it be enough to create any 
presumption thereof. See Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require 
Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 185 (2007). Market harm comes from actual, 
not presumed, substitution. 
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B. Publishers Have Failed To Prove That Educational Use of 
Their Works Has Any Impact on Author, or Even Publisher, 
Incentives to Create or Disseminate Works 
 
Next, Publishers and their amici argue that, unless the Court finds 
educational use of their works infringing, academic authors and publishers will no 
longer have sufficient incentives to create or disseminate academic work. This 
argument is both purely speculative, and belied by academic authors’ rapidly 
growing adoption of open access practices and technologies.20 Publishers again 
offer no evidence of potential adverse impacts. Appellants’ Br. at 79 (citing instead 
what they describe as “predictable” adverse impacts on their business).21 Similarly, 
Publishers’ amici suggest that “the district court’s decision, if upheld, is likely to 
have a direct impact on the copyright incentives to disseminate works that are 
specifically intended to further human knowledge.” Text and Academic Authors 
Association and the Authors Guild Amicus Br. at 14-15.22 Yet behind these bold 
                                                                
20 The district court correctly concluded that there was “no persuasive evidence 
that Plaintiffs’ ability to publish high quality scholarly books would be appreciably 
diminished by the modest relief from academic permissions payments.” Dkt#423 at 
86. 
21 Similarly, in the context of photocopying, researchers have tried in vain to 
identify evidence of negative effects on publishers’ markets. See Diane 
Zimmermann, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights and Claims of Harm: 
Insights from the Curious History of Photocopying (NYU Law & Economics 
Working Paper #12-22, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129458.  
22 Text and Academic Authors Association and the Authors Guild amici also 
suggest that “[s]alary increases and merit pay in most research institutions are tied 
directly to the professors’ publishing record. In some cases, there are very direct 
economic benefits to academics from publishing scholarly works.” Text and 
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assertions are no citations to actual evidence that scholarly publishing or human 
knowledge are actually at risk. Rather, these assertions ignore several important 
developments in the scholarly publishing ecosystem that undermine these 
arguments.  
First, Publishers ignore the reasons why many of the materials in question 
were produced in the first place. They fail to acknowledge that many if not most 
academic authors write primarily for reasons unrelated to the profitability of any 
particular work, instead focusing on reaching the widest possible audience and 
making the greatest possible contributions to their field. See ALMA SWAN & 
SHERIDAN BROWN, OPEN ACCESS SELF-ARCHIVING: AN AUTHOR STUDY 10 (2005), 
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/Open%20Access%20Self%20Archivin
g-an%20author%20study.pdf (explaining that “[t]he principle of free access for all 
readers” was the most oft-cited reason indicated by academic author survey-
respondent as to why they publish in open access journals); see also Shahren 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Academic Authors Assoc. and the Authors Guild Amicus Br. at 14-15. Amici cite 
to the University of California, Academic Personnel Policy, available at 
http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel/academic-personnel-policy/, to support 
the contention that “University of California provides a promotion that comes with 
an approximately $5,000 salary increase for each book published.”  
Several signatories to this brief are University of California faculty and are 
familiar with its academic personnel policies. None of us—nor our contacts at the 
University of California Office of the President—have been able to confirm the 
existence of this policy. The University typically awards promotion or tenure only 
after an in-depth review of a candidate’s performance. This would include an 
assessment of the publishing record but also many other factors. 
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Ahmad Zaidi Adruce, Academic Authors’ Perception on Copyright Protection, 
149-50 (March 11, 2004) (Ph.D Dissertation, Syracuse University) (available via 
ProQuest) (in a survey of tenured, tenure-track, adjunct and emeritus faculty, 
concluding that “academic authors are not primarily motivated by monetary 
rewards when they write/create works. . . . Academic authors who are motivated in 
this context write/create . . . to get appreciation, to get acknowledgement, to gain 
recognition and popularity, and to leave an intellectual legacy to others.”).  
If anything, a fair use rule that allows for the uses made in this case 
promotes academic authors’ interests and enhances their incentive to create and 
distribute scholarly works because it increases access to their works in educational 
settings, one of the most important markets to academics in terms of building 
reputational capital and increasing the impact of their work.  
These motivations are now supported by a growing number of new, high 
quality academic publishers who support making scholarly works openly and 
freely available. See, e.g., OPEN HUMANITIES PRESS, 
http://openhumanitiespress.org/index.html (last visited April 23, 2013)(publisher of 
open access monographs); DIRECTORY OF OPEN ACCESS BOOKS, 
http://www.doabooks.org/ (last visited April 23, 2013) (listing 1,410 academic 
peer-reviewed books available for free); DIRECTORY OF OPEN ACCESS JOURNALS, 
http://www.doaj.org/ (last visited April 23, 2013) (listing 9,006 freely available 
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academic journals). Many open access publishing platforms offer faculty a simple 
process for uploading their works directly, see SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/ (last visited April 23, 2013), thus allowing the 
creation and dissemination of more academic works with a few simple clicks of a 
mouse, and at no cost to the author. The recent development of these high quality 
publishing outlets means that academic authors can now publish in forums that 
allow for far more permissive uses than those contemplated by the district court’s 
fair use ruling.  
Publishers’ narrative about market harm and aggregate effect also fails to 
account for serious market failures. Educational users often cannot license access 
to Publishers’ works even if they wanted to. Digital licenses were available in only 
44 of the 75 claimed instances of infringements in this case, and those 75 claims 
were hand-picked by Publishers as presumably their best cases. Dkt#441 at 14 
(district court order explaining Publishers’ selection of claims). Looking at 
widespread use, the likelihood of harm is small because so few works are actually 
available in the markets in which users can participate while still fulfilling the 
learning and discussion goals described above. Recognizing this, the district court 
correctly concluded that “[f]or loss of potential license revenue to cut against fair 
use, the evidence must show that licenses for excerpts of the works at issue are 
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easily accessible, reasonably priced, and that they offer excerpts in a format which 
is reasonably convenient for users.” Dkt#423 at 75. 
Indeed, in many instances it is unlikely that Publishers can offer licenses at 
all because they do not own the necessary rights to the work in digital formats; 
instead, those rights belong to academic authors like amici. See Random House, 
Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (author retained 
digital rights because contract with publisher to publish “in book form” did not 
cover electronic versions);23 Dkt#441 at 14 (Publishers could not establish a prima 
facie claim of infringement in 26 of 75 claimed instances of infringement, in part 
because of an inability to prove ownership). 
Despite this, Publishers’ proposed injunctive relief would require GSU to 
either license access or comply with a rigid set of guidelines that do not match the 
flexible case-by-case analysis that fair use requires or academics need. Dkt#426, 
Exhibit A (Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction). While some digital licenses may be 
available through collective management organizations like the Copyright 
Clearance Center (“CCC”), the use of those services raise other risks. CCC admits, 
for example, that its licenses are “net of fair use,” meaning their license fees do not 
                                                                
23 For many other works, educational users face market failure because they 
confront the problem of “orphan works”—i.e. copyrighted works whose owners 
cannot be located—and therefore are unable to seek permission. See U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
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take into account fair use. Dkt#423 at 30. Without taking fair use into account, 
these licenses become blunt tools that charge for, and therefore discourage, 
legitimate educational uses of the kind that fair use is meant to foster.24 Further, 
requiring licensing that practically would flow through clearinghouses like the 
CCC could concentrate the market and undermine the development of other 
competing models that better support academics’ needs.25 
While licensing regimes and rigid use guidelines—along with Publishers’ 
more general unsupported assumptions about market harm—would benefit 
Publishers, they do not match the evidence in this case. Acceptance of these 
                                                                
24 In countries where licensing for educational uses are the norm, overaggressive 
licensing regimes have quickly smothered educational copyright exceptions and 
have led to abusive pricing practices even when they are supposedly regulated. See 
Submission of Copyright Advisory Group –Schools to Australian Law Reform 
Commission Consultation of Copyright and the Digital Economy 5, 58 (Nov. 
2012), 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/231._org_thecopyrightadvisorygrou
p_schools.pdf (reporting for educational uses a steady and significant increase in 
licensing fees over time, from AU$9,756,254 in 1998 to over AU$80 million in 
2011); Jonathan Band, Cautionary Tales About Collective Rights Organizations 1 
(unpublished manuscript, Sept. 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2149036 (review of 
licensing organizations “reveals a long history of corruption, mismanagement, 
confiscation of funds, [and the aggressive pursuit of] fees to which they were not 
legally entitled”); see also Resnick v. Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 422 F. 
Supp.2d 252, 257 (D. Mass. 2006) (CCC is aware that it licenses (and therefore 
collects fees for) works for which it has no rights); Ariel Katz, The GSU Copyright 
Case: Some Canadian Perspectives ARIELKATZ.ORG, May 14, 2012 
http://arielkatz.org/the-gsu-copyright-case-some-canadian-perspectives/ 
25 CCC presents a special risk because, as the district court found, “CCC is the only 
reproduction rights organization in the United States, and is the world’s largest 
licensing organization for text licensing. It has no real competitors in that arena.” 
Dkt#423 at 24 (citations omitted). 
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assertions would prevent a large number of socially beneficial educational uses. 
Publishers have failed to prove a genuine likelihood of harm to a relevant market, 
and therefore the fourth fair use factor should weigh in favor of the use by GSU. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to affirm the decision 
below and to affirm the transformative nature of the educational uses made by 
GSU faculty.  
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